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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In the summer of 2003, the United States Supreme Court, in De-
sert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, held that a plaintiff in a Title VII employ-
ment discrimination case no longer needed to produce direct evidence 
in order to receive a mixed-motive jury instruction.1 While the Court 
clearly overruled the direct evidence requirement set forth in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 it remains unclear what impact, if any, De-
sert Palace has beyond its narrow holding.3  
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2006; M.S. Florida International 
University, 2002; B.S., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1995. Special thanks to Professors 
Gregory Mitchell and Charles Ehrhardt for their valuable guidance on earlier drafts of this 
Note.  
 1. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).  
 2. 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). In Price Water-
house, Justice O’Connor wrote that “the burden on the issue of causation” only shifts to the 
employer where “a disparate treatment plaintiff [could] show by direct evidence that an il-
legitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision.” Id. While no other Justice 
joined O’Connor’s concurrence, most courts considered her concurrence as controlling. See 
Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual 
Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 873 (2004) (“Justice O’Connor’s 
viewpoint concerning direct versus circumstantial evidence, though expressed in a concur-
ring opinion, rose to predominance among the circuits. The rationale for adopting [her] po-
sition was that it provided the narrowest ground for the Court’s decision.”). 
 3. T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v. Costa 
on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 137, 138 
(2004) (“[Desert Palace] has sent a buzz of excitement and confusion among members of the 
employment bar and judges of the lower federal courts.”); Michael Abbott, Note, A Swing 
and a Miss: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Attempt to Resolve the Confusion over the Proper 
Evidentiary Burden for Employment Discrimination Litigation in Costa v. Desert Palace, 
30 J. CORP. L. 573, 587 (2005) (noting that Desert Palace did little to resolve confusion as 
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 “No issue is more crucial to the litigation of intentional discrimi-
nation cases than determining what effect [Desert Palace] has on the 
pretext proof structure developed by the Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green.”4 This is especially true at the summary judgment 
stage, “where most employment discrimination cases are either won 
or lost.”5 Unfortunately, however, courts have failed to reach a con-
sensus in terms of Desert Palace’s proper effect on the summary 
judgment analysis in Title VII litigation. As one scholar recently 
noted, “Litigants, lawyers, and judges need an answer to that ques-
tion now.”6 
 This Note ultimately addresses the proper post-Desert Palace Title 
VII summary judgment analysis. Accordingly, Part I of this Note be-
gins by reviewing the pre-Desert Palace landscape. It provides a gen-
eral overview of the McDonnell Douglas7 single-motive analysis, of-
ten referred to as “pretext” analysis, and the Price Waterhouse 
mixed-motive analysis. Also, it addresses the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.8 Part II then analyzes the Court’s unanimous decision in Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Costa. Part III narrows the focus to summary judg-
ment and reviews the Title VII summary judgment landscape that 
existed prior to Desert Palace. Part IV then explores the three gen-
eral responses to Desert Palace’s impact on summary judgment. Fi-
nally, Part V counters two of these responses and concludes with an 
argument for Desert Palace’s proper impact at the summary judg-
ment stage of a Title VII claim. 
II.   THE PRE-DESERT PALACE LANDSCAPE 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an “unlawful 
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any 
individual . . . because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin.”9 The central question in every claim of employment discrimina-
tion, therefore, is “whether the plaintiff was the victim of intentional 
discrimination.”10 Thus, proving intentional discrimination requires 
that a plaintiff demonstrate that an employer made an adverse em-
                                                                                                                     
“clearly evidenced by the application of the Court’s holding by the several District and Cir-
cuit courts that have followed the opinion”). 
 4. William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1549, 1550 (2005).  
 5. Jaclyn Borcherding, Note, Deserting McDonnell Douglas? Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 243, 262 (2005). 
 6. Corbett, supra note 4, at 1550.  
 7. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 8. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 10. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).  
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ployment decision against them because of their race, sex, or other 
protected category.  
 Prior to Desert Palace, two frameworks governed the Title VII 
employment discrimination landscape: the McDonnell Douglas “sin-
gle-motive,” three-step, burden-shifting framework and the Price 
Waterhouse “mixed-motive” framework.11  
A.   The McDonnell Douglas Single-Motive Analysis 
 In 1973, in response to “a notable lack of harmony” in causation 
analysis among the lower courts, the Supreme Court, in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, created a burden-shifting framework to be 
used in all Title VII cases alleging discriminatory treatment.12 In 
short, the McDonnell Douglas three-prong framework requires (1) 
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, (2) the defendant to ar-
ticulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action, 
and (3) the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s reason is pretext.13  
In later cases, such as Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine14 and St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,15 the Court clarified 
the burdens of proof associated with each prong.  
 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of intentional 
discrimination.16 While the prima facie case will vary depending on 
the different factual situations involved in an individual claim,17 in 
the context of hiring, a plaintiff generally must show that (1) the 
plaintiff is part of a protected group, (2) the plaintiff applied and was 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Davis, supra note 2, at 863. 
 12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801-02; see also Michael Selmi, Proving Inten-
tional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 324 (1997). 
As Professor Selmi explained:  
In a series of cases beginning in 1973, the Court created what has become a 
familiar proof structure for individual cases of employment discrimination. The 
structure is familiar not only because it has become an entrenched part of em-
ployment discrimination law, but also because it was developed based on famil-
iar principles of evidence, including the use of presumptions to control the or-
der of proof. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 13. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804.  
 14. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).  
 15. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).  
 16. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
 17. Id. at 802 n.13; see, e.g., Benton v. ARA Food Servs. Inc., 8 F.3d 816, No. 93-1002, 
1993 WL 425183, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1993) (proving a violation in a termination case 
requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was 
qualified for his job and his job performance was satisfactory, (3) in spite of [his] qualifica-
tions and performance, he was fired, and (4) the position remained open to similarly quali-
fied applicants after his dismissal”); Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 963 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (proving a violation in a failure to promote case requires a plaintiff to show that 
“he is a member of a protected class; he was qualified for and applied for the promotion; he 
was rejected; and other equally or less qualified employees who were not members of the 
protected class were promoted”).  
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qualified for the job for which the employer was hiring, (3) that, de-
spite the plaintiff’s qualifications, the plaintiff was rejected, and (4) 
that, after rejection, the position remained open.18 Requiring plain-
tiffs to establish the prima facie case, as the Burdine Court ex-
plained, “serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates 
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejec-
tion.”19 For example, again in the context of hiring, the prima facie 
case demonstrates that a plaintiff’s rejection did not result from the 
two most common legitimate reasons an employer might rely on for 
rejecting a job applicant: “an absolute or relative lack of qualifica-
tions or the absence of a vacancy in the job sought.”20 However, once 
a plaintiff successfully proves the prima facie case, a presumption21 of 
illegal discrimination is created.22  
 Second, after a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimi-
natory reason for the adverse employment action.23 The Court has 
explained that while a defendant employer does not have to convince 
a court that it was motivated by its proffered reason, the defendant 
must at least present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.24 The defen-
dant only bears a burden of production, not persuasion, and thus, 
does not have to persuade a court that it was actually motivated by 
the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.25 Once the defendant satis-
                                                                                                                     
 18. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
 19. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.  
 20. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).  
 21. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993). Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Scalia explained:  
To establish a “presumption” is to say that a finding of the predicate fact (here, 
the prima facie case) produces “a required conclusion in the absence of explana-
tion” (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination). Thus, the McDonnell Doug-
las presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an expla-
nation to rebut the prima facie case . . . . 
Id. 
 22. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. Further, the Court, in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Wa-
ters, explained:  
A prima facie case . . . raises an inference of discrimination only because we 
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based 
on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume 
this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not 
people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying rea-
sons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for re-
jecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the em-
ployer’s action, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally as-
sume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible con-
sideration such as race.  
 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (citation omitted).  
 23. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
 24. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.  
 25. Id.  
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fies this burden of production, the presumption of illegal discrimina-
tion is eliminated.26 
 Finally, assuming the employer’s articulated reason suffices, the 
burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s 
stated reason is pretext.27 Plaintiffs can demonstrate pretext by pro-
viding evidence showing that the employer’s stated reason is not the 
true reason for the adverse employment decision.28 In McDonnell 
Douglas, the Supreme Court articulated several ways plaintiffs could 
prove pretext, including the following: use of a comparator to prove 
that nonminorities were involved in similar acts of misconduct but 
were not terminated or were promoted; demonstrate how the em-
ployer treated the plaintiff during employment; present the em-
ployer’s general policies and practices in terms of minority employ-
ment; or provide statistical evidence.29 Ultimately, the burden of per-
suasion remains with the plaintiff.30  
 Because proving intentional discrimination is quite difficult31 and 
because cases involving alleged discrimination “pose difficult and 
sensitive issues of subjective intent and objective action,”32 the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis provides an invaluable method of “pro-
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 255 (“If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption 
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted . . . .”). 
 27. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.  
 28. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.  
 29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.  
 30. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that 
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with 
the plaintiff.”); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). In Hicks, 
Justice Scalia explained that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework operates 
like all presumptions, as described in Federal Rule of Evidence 301:  
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of 
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party 
on whom it was originally cast. 
 Id.  
 31. Davis, supra note 2, at 864. Professor Davis, in response to why the Court created 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, explained:  
One might wonder why the Court felt obliged to engage in such an endeavor. 
Subtle discrimination cases such as McDonnell Douglas had dogged the judici-
ary because of the elusiveness of proving or disproving discriminatory intent. 
Unlike most other types of cases, discrimination suits often rest on a thin evi-
dentiary base. By way of contrast, in a breach of contract case written docu-
ments frequently provide an evidentiary record of relevant transactions. In 
auto accident cases, forensic evidence and eyewitness accounts may resolve 
contested issues of fact. But many discrimination cases depend on revealing 
shadowy motives that no one would publicly articulate or be foolish enough to 
memorialize.  
Id.  
 32. Hall v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 326 F.3d 1157, 1167 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  
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gressively . . . sharpen[ing] the inquiry into the elusive factual ques-
tion of intentional discrimination.”33 As the Burdine Court explained, 
the burden of persuasion “that the defendant intentionally discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.”34 
Accordingly, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evi-
dentiary burdens serves to bring the litigants and the court expedi-
tiously and fairly to this ultimate question.”35  
B.   The Price Waterhouse Mixed-Motive Analysis 
 The McDonnell Douglas scheme was born out of the notion that 
Title VII cases required proof of but-for, or sole-factor, causation.36 
This meant that plaintiffs essentially had to prove that but for the 
plaintiff’s protected status, the employer would not have taken the 
adverse employment action.37 The Court’s decision in Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, however, broadened the causation element to allow 
plaintiffs to prove a Title VII violation if a plaintiff can demonstrate 
that an impermissible reason was a factor in the employment deci-
sion.38 Most importantly, Price Waterhouse rejected the notion that 
employers act with only a single motive, and a mixed-motive analysis 
was born.39  
 The facts of Price Waterhouse illustrate the need for a mixed-motive 
framework. Ann Hopkins, a senior manager at Price Waterhouse, was 
denied partnership and sued claiming she was discriminated against 
on the basis of her sex.40 The year Hopkins was up for partner, she was 
the only woman out of eighty-eight candidates.41 Despite securing ma-
jor contracts42 with greater success than any other candidate, Hopkins 
was denied partnership for lack of interpersonal skills.43 Apparently, 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. 
 34. Id. at 253.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Corbett, supra note 4, at 1567-68. Professor Corbett explained:  
It is often stated that the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis adopted a but-for 
standard of causation. Indeed, I have said that. I want to confess that I now have 
reservations about characterizing the pretext analysis as incorporating but-for 
causation. It may be more accurate to characterize the pretext analysis, at least 
as it is stated (though perhaps not as it is applied), as incorporating sole-factor 
causation.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 37. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989).  
 38. Id. at 241 (emphasizing that “since we know that the words ‘because of’ do not 
mean ‘solely because of,’ we also know that Title VII meant to condemn even those deci-
sions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations” (footnote omitted)).  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 231-32.  
 41. Id. at 233 (“Of the 662 partners at the firm at that time, 7 were women.”).  
 42. Id. (noting that Hopkins secured a $25 million contract with the Department of 
State). 
 43. Id. at 234-35.  
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while clients viewed her aggressiveness and attention to detail favora-
bly, staff members complained that Hopkins was “abrasive” and 
“brusque.”44 At the same time, there were written comments—
submitted by partners when Hopkins was a partnership candidate—
that reflected sexual stereotyping.45 For example, partners described 
Hopkins as “macho” and in need of “a course at charm school.”46 Part-
ners complained of Hopkins’ use of profanity “because it’s a lady using 
foul language.”47 But, the “coup de grace,” as the Court described it, 
was a member of the policy board advising Hopkins that to improve 
her chances for partnership, she should “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up [sic], have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”48 
 The Price Waterhouse plurality rejected the notion that Title VII 
claims require but-for causation.49 Instead, the plurality construed 
the “because of” element as meaning that the discriminatory, im-
proper reason could be a sufficient, even if it is not a necessary, con-
dition of an adverse employment action.50 Here, while Price Water-
house had a legitimate reason for its employment action (Hopkins’ 
lack of interpersonal skills), according to the plurality it nonetheless 
violated Title VII because Hopkins’ gender was a relevant factor in 
its decision to deny her partnership.51 Thus, a mixed-motive analysis 
was born, which recognized that employers could take action against 
an employee for both legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  
 As Justice White explained in his concurring opinion:  
The Court has made clear that “mixed-motives” cases, such as the 
present one, are different from pretext cases such as McDonnell 
Douglas and Burdine. In pretext cases, “the issue is whether either 
illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the ‘true’ motives be-
hind the decision.” In mixed-motives cases, however, there is no 
one “true” motive behind the decision. Instead, the decision is a re-
sult of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate.52 
 The most important aspect of Price Waterhouse, however, is Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurrence.53 While concurring in judgment, Justice 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. at 234.  
 45. Id. at 235. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 240 (“To construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial shorthand for ‘but-for 
causation’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”).  
 50. Id. at 240-41. 
 51. See id. at 239. 
 52. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).  
 53. Justice O’Connor’s opinion was considered “as the concurrence issued on the nar-
rowest grounds, and thus has been viewed as part of the ‘rule’ from Price Waterhouse.” 
Cassandra A. Giles, Note, Shaking Price Waterhouse: Suggestions for a More Workable 
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O’Connor rejected the plurality’s opinion that “because of” did not re-
quire but-for causation.54 Instead, in order to shift the burden on the 
issue of causation back to the defendant, the “plaintiff must show by 
direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor 
in the decision.”55 Thus, according to Justice O’Connor, “once a Title 
VII plaintiff has demonstrated by direct evidence that discriminatory 
animus played a significant or substantial role in the employment 
decision, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the decision 
would have been the same absent discrimination.”56 Justice Ken-
nedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse labeled Justice O’Connor’s direct-
evidence requirement as the “actual holding” of the case.57 Accord-
ingly, following the Price Waterhouse decision, most courts had 
adopted Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement.58   
C.   The Civil Rights Act of 1991 
 In the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act), Congress codified 
the mixed-motive analysis: “an unlawful employment practice is es-
tablished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any em-
ployment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.”59 Once the plaintiff has made this showing, an employer cannot 
escape liability. However, through use of a limited affirmative de-
fense, if an employer can demonstrate that it “would have taken the 
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,” it 
can restrict the plaintiff’s damages to injunctive, declaratory relief, 
and attorney’s fees and costs.60  
 Significantly, instead of embracing Justice O’Connor’s “substantial 
factor” test, Congress formalized the plurality’s “motivating factor” 
analysis.61 Congress, however, did not follow Price Waterhouse’s “same-
decision” affirmative defense, which allowed defendants to escape li-
                                                                                                                     
Approach to Title VII Mixed Motive Disparate Treatment Discrimination Claims, 37 IND. L. 
REV. 815, 816 (2004).  
 54. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring).  
 55. Id. at 276 (emphasis added).  
 56. Id. (quoting the lower court’s opinion, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 
470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 57. Id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
 58. See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Taylor v. Va. 
Union Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Ma-
sonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 91 F.3d 
1449, 1453-54 (11th Cir. 1996). All of these cases were either directly or indirectly abro-
gated by Desert Palace, Inc.  v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (emphasis added).  
 60. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 61. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII 
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 92 (2004) (noting that the 1991 Act “clari-
fied the Price Waterhouse plurality’s motivating factor test and made it a formal part of Ti-
tle VII”). 
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ability completely; instead it chose to limit the defense so that a plain-
tiff’s monetary recovery would be reduced to attorney’s fees and costs.62  
 Post-Price Waterhouse and despite the 1991 Act, most courts still 
followed Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse concurrence and re-
quired plaintiffs to present direct evidence in order to proceed on a 
mixed-motive theory.63 In fact, before the Ninth Circuit’s en banc 
holding in Desert Palace, “every single court of appeals but the Ninth 
Circuit had adopted the evidentiary rule set out in Justice 
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse opinion.”64  
III.   ANALYSIS OF THE DESERT PALACE DECISION 
 Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court in Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, explained, “This case provides us with the first oppor-
tunity to consider the effects of the 1991 Act on jury instructions in 
mixed-motive cases.”65 And, based on the language in the 1991 Act, 
the Supreme Court held that direct evidence is not required for a 
plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction.66  
 In Desert Palace, Catharina Costa claimed she was discriminated 
against based on her gender.67 Costa was the only female worker in a 
Las Vegas hotel and casino warehouse.68 During her employment, 
Costa had problems with coworkers and management, which led to 
frequent disciplinary action and suspension.69 After a physical alter-
cation with a male coworker, Costa was terminated while the male 
coworker received a five-day suspension.70 The district court, despite 
the lack of direct evidence, gave a mixed-motive jury instruction.71  
The jury found in favor of Costa, awarding her backpay, compensa-
tory damages, and punitive damages.72 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 92-93; Daniel P. Johnson, Note, Employment Law: Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa: Returning to Title VII’s Core Principles by Eliminating the Direct Evidence Re-
quirement in Mixed-Motive Cases, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 403, 427 (2004) (explaining that the 
1991 Act, unlike Price Waterhouse, “limits the remedies available to plaintiffs if the defen-
dant is able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same 
adverse employment action even if the forbidden characteristic was not considered”).  
 63. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95 (noting that a number of courts, relying on Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence, “held that direct evidence is required to establish liability under § 
2000e-2(m)”); Chambers, supra note 61, at 90 (noting that even though Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion was “written only for herself,” her opinion “was considered by many to be the op-
erative holding of Price Waterhouse”).  
 64. Nagy, supra note 3, at 141. 
 65. Desert Palace, 539 U.S at 98.  
 66. Id. at 92.  
 67. Id. at 96.  
 68. Id. at 95.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 95-96.  
 71. Id. at 96.  
 72. Id. at 97. Ultimately, the jury awarded Costa $364,377.74: “$200,000 in compen-
satory damages, $100,000 in punitive damages, and $64,377.74 in backpay.” Michael J. 
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 Desert Palace appealed, and the court of appeals initially held that 
the district court erred in giving the mixed-motive instruction because 
Costa provided no direct evidence of discrimination.73 After rehearing 
the case en banc, however, the court of appeals held that the 1991 Act 
abrogated Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement.74  
 The Supreme Court affirmed, ultimately rejecting the direct evi-
dence requirement. Recognizing the value of circumstantial evidence 
in proving discrimination, the Court stressed that “[t]he reason for 
treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and 
deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may 
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’ ”75 
Thus, plaintiffs are no longer required to present direct evidence in 
order to receive a mixed-motive instruction.  
IV.   THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT LANDSCAPE—PRE-DESERT PALACE 
 Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law.”76 Defendant employers, “in order to prevail, must 
do one of two things: show that the [plaintiff] has no evidence to sup-
port [its] case, or present ‘affirmative evidence demonstrating that the 
[plaintiff] will be unable to prove . . . [its] case at trial.’ ”77 Once the de-
fendant moves for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plain-
tiff to demonstrate why summary judgment is inappropriate.78 To sur-
vive summary judgment, the plaintiff “must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue [of material fact] for trial.”79  
 In the employment context at the summary judgment stage, the 
ultimate question of law is “whether the evidence is sufficient to cre-
ate a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff because of [the protected charac-
teristic.]”80 While standard civil litigation rules apply to Title VII 
cases, the Court developed the McDonnell Douglas framework to 
                                                                                                                     
Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell 
Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1916 n.121 (2004) (citing Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 
F.3d 838, 846 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 73. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 97.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 100. (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)).  
 76. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 
 77. Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1141 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437-38 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).  
 78. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  
 79. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).  
 80. Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 2005) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 
1996)).   
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guide judges and factfinders in evaluating circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination in the employment context.81 Prior to Desert Palace, 
the summary judgment landscape followed the same basic single-
motive and mixed-motive dichotomy.  
 Under the McDonnell Douglas single-motive approach, a defen-
dant employer will be granted summary judgment if it articulates a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment de-
cision and the plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the stated reason is 
pretext.82 Price Waterhouse, however, only requires the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that a discriminatory reason was a motivating factor.83 
Thus, even when an employer provides a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason, a plaintiff can survive summary judgment by demon-
strating that an impermissible reason remained “a factor” in the ad-
verse employment decision.84  
 Thus, the two approaches differ on who bears the ultimate burden 
of “proving or disproving the defendant’s nondiscriminatory justifica-
tion for the challenged decision: under McDonnell Douglas the plain-
tiff must disprove the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason, 
while under Price Waterhouse the defendant must prove that its al-
leged nondiscriminatory reason was a determinative cause for the 
adverse employment decision.”85 
V.   DESERT PALACE’S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 In terms of the viability of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
analysis at the summary judgment stage, there are essentially three 
responses to Desert Palace: (1) the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals hold that McDonnell Douglas is unaffected by De-
sert Palace,86 (2) many scholars argue that Desert Palace signifies the 
death of McDonnell Douglas,87 and (3) the Fourth and Fifth Circuit 
Courts of Appeal argue that Desert Palace alters the third prong of 
the McDonnell Douglas framework.88  
                                                                                                                     
 81. Chambers, supra note 61, at 84. (“When Title VII was enacted, standard civil liti-
gation rules applied to disparate treatment cases. However, in McDonnell Douglas v. 
Green, the Court developed a pretext test that forced factfinders to evaluate circumstantial 
evidence in a particular way.”).  
 82. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).  
 83. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240 (1989).  
 84. See id.  
 85. Davis, supra note 2, at 860 (footnotes omitted).  
 86. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004); Cooper v. South-
ern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004).  
 87. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive le Roi!”: An Essay on the 
Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003).  
 88. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).  
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 Between the three options—applying Desert Palace solely to 
mixed-motive cases, abandoning McDonnell Douglas, or merging De-
sert Palace with McDonnell Douglas—this Note argues that, ulti-
mately, Desert Palace merely modifies the McDonnell Douglas sum-
mary judgment analysis.  
A.   Leaving McDonnell Douglas Unaffected 
 Many courts and commentators argue that Desert Palace has no 
impact on the McDonnell Douglas single-motive framework. In fact, 
in response to recent scholarly articles, one court made clear that “to 
paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the death of McDonnell Douglas 
are exaggerated.”89  
 There are four basic arguments why McDonnell Douglas remains 
unaffected: (1) Desert Palace’s holding was too narrow, (2) that, be-
cause Desert Palace did not cite to McDonnell Douglas, it clearly has 
no effect on it, (3) Desert Palace’s holding does not address pretrial 
litigation, and (4) the Supreme Court, post-Desert Palace, has spoken 
directly to McDonnell Douglas’s continued validity.90  
 First, Desert Palace’s holding is too narrow. As the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stressed in Cooper v. Southern Co., “the Desert Palace holding 
was expressly limited to the context of mixed-motive discrimination 
cases under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).”91 Further, the Supreme Court 
expressly made clear that it did not decide whether its analysis ap-
plied in other contexts.92 The Eighth Circuit in Griffith v. City of Des 
Moines, in rejecting the argument that Desert Palace modified the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, made clear that because Desert Pal-
ace only dealt with mixed-motive jury instructions, it therefore had 
no effect on summary judgment.93 
 Second, if Desert Palace significantly changed the Title VII land-
scape, then surely the Supreme Court would have at least cited 
McDonnell Douglas in its decision. “[I]f those declaring McDonnell 
Douglas dead were correct, that death came through an odd si-
lence.”94 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that “the fact that the 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Herawi v. Ala. Dep’t of Forensic Scis., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 
2004).  
 90. See, e.g., Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 
DRAKE L. REV. 383, 395-402 (2004).  
 91. Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004).  
 92. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n.1 (2003) (“This case does not re-
quire us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motive context.”).  
 93. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Desert Palace, a 
decision in which the Supreme Court decided only a mixed motive jury instruction issue, is 
an inherently unreliable basis for district courts to begin ignoring this Circuit’s controlling 
summary judgment precedents.”). 
 94. Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing—Why Desert 
Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas nor Transformed All Employment Discrimi-
2006]                          OASIS OR MIRAGE? 1189 
 
Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas in Desert Palace 
makes us . . . reluctant to believe that Desert Palace should be under-
stood to overrule that seminal precedent.”95  
 Third, because Desert Palace dealt with mixed-motive jury in-
structions, it has no effect on summary judgment. As the Eighth Cir-
cuit stressed in Torlowei v. Target, “Desert Palace is applicable to 
post-trial jury instructions, and not to the analysis performed at 
summary judgment.”96  Therefore, the McDonnell Douglas framework 
is still properly applied at earlier stages of the proceeding, like sum-
mary judgment, whereas Desert Palace does not apply until the trial 
phase.97  
 Finally, the Supreme Court approved the continued validity of 
McDonnell Douglas after its Desert Palace holding.98 The Eighth Cir-
cuit in Griffith pronounced that “[f]or concrete evidence confirming 
that Desert Palace did not forecast a sea change in the Court’s think-
ing, we need look no further than Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, a post-
Desert Palace decision in which the Court approved use of the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment stage.”99  
 As the Raytheon Court explained:  
 The Court in McDonnell Douglas set forth a burden-shifting 
scheme for discriminatory treatment cases. Under McDonnell 
Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If 
the employer meets this burden, the presumption of intentional 
discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove dispa-
rate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrating 
that the employer’s explanation is pretextual. The Courts of Ap-
peals have consistently utilized this burden-shifting approach 
when reviewing motions for summary judgment in disparate-
treatment cases.100 
If the Court “had opined that [Desert Palace] overruled McDonnell 
Douglas, then Raytheon presented an excellent opportunity for the 
                                                                                                                     
nation Cases to Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 395, 405 (2005) (“[N]othing in Desert Pal-
ace hints at the death or even wounding of McDonnell Douglas.”).  
 95. Cooper, 390 F.3d at 725 n.17.  
 96. Torlowei v. Target, 401 F.3d 933, 934 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 97. See Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing that because Desert Palace was a post-trial appeal, it “really has no direct impact in the 
summary judgment context”).  
 98. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003).  
 99. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); 
see also Helfrich v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., No. Civ.A. 03-CV-05793, WL 1715689, at *6 (E.D. 
Pa. July 21, 2005) (noting Raytheon’s implicit confirmation that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework still applies at summary judgment).  
 100. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49 n.3 (citations omitted).  
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Court to say so.”101 Accordingly, along with the Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits, the Third, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, even though not 
addressing Desert Palace’s effect on McDonnell Douglas directly, 
have continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis to disparate 
treatment cases.102  
B.   Abandoning McDonnell Douglas 
 By eliminating the direct evidence requirement, Desert Palace 
removed the only legal distinction that separated single-motive 
McDonnell Douglas cases and mixed-motive Price Waterhouse 
cases.103 Thus, because there is no longer a viable way to distinguish 
between those cases operating under a single-motive analysis and 
those operating under a mixed-motive analysis, all cases should be 
treated as mixed-motive. Accordingly, pursuant to Desert Palace, ap-
plying the McDonnell Douglas framework is no longer justified.  
 Less than a week after Desert Palace was decided, the first case to 
apply its holding was Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.104 In Dare, the 
court made clear that, post-Desert Palace, the McDonnell Douglas 
framework should be abandoned.105  
 The Dare court explained that, under a single-motive analysis, 
“either the plaintiff is correct in alleging that an illegitimate factor 
alone motivated the defendant or the defendant’s legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason was the only reason for the decision.”106 Thus, 
when the court considers the parties’ “mutually exclusive reasons for 
the employment decision, only two scenarios are possible: either the 
defendant’s proferred reason is (a) true and valid; or it is (b) false and 
invalid.”107 Under (b) the plaintiff wins; however, under (a), McDon-
nell Douglas would dictate that the defendant wins.108 Because under 
scenario (a) a plaintiff (for example, Ann Hopkins) operating under a 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Hedican et al., supra note 90, at 401.  
 102. McClam-Brown v. Boeing Co., 142 F.App’x 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We need not re-
solve appellants’ contention that the District Court should have conducted an inquiry un-
der Desert Palace, rather than McDonnell Douglas, however, because appellants failed to 
produce sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence to cast doubt on Boeing’s stated rea-
sons for the challenged employment actions.”); Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 
444 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply a mixed-motive analysis for an ADA claim); Leong v. 
Potter, 347 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing Title VII case under the McDonnell Doug-
las framework without mentioning Desert Palace); Tesh v. U.S. Postal Serv., 349 F.3d 1270 
(10th Cir. 2003) (applying McDonnell Douglas without reference to Desert Palace).  
 103. Borcherding, supra note 5, at 244; see also Chambers, supra note 61, at 95 (argu-
ing that Desert Palace implicitly eliminated “any logical distinction” between mixed-motive 
and pretext cases).   
 104. 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003).  
 105. Id. at 991-92. 
 106. Id. at 991.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
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mixed-motive theory would lose, the Dare court felt the need to scrap 
the McDonnell Douglas framework altogether. The Dare court made 
clear that the result in scenario (a), therefore, “is incomplete, illogi-
cal, and prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”109  
 The Dare court further stressed that “[t]he dichotomy produced by 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is a false one . . . [because] few 
employment decisions are made solely on [the] basis of one rationale 
to the exclusion of all others.”110 Ultimately, the Dare court made 
clear that it did “not see the efficacy in perpetuating this legal fiction 
implicitly exposed by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Desert Palace.”111 
 While acknowledging that Desert Palace did not expressly overrule 
McDonnell Douglas, based on what the Court said, “it necessarily fol-
lows that McDonnell Douglas is gone.”112 In fact, some “insist that ‘the 
Supreme Court did not say what impact Desert Palace would have on 
McDonnell Douglas [because] the result is so obvious it is likely the 
Court felt no need to explain’—that result being summary judgment is 
almost never proper.”113 Essentially, then, Desert Palace means that all 
cases can now be considered mixed-motive; therefore, even when a de-
fendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the case 
should still proceed to a jury to determine if the alleged discriminatory 
reason was still a relevant factor.114  
 As one scholar metaphorically stated:  
 It is time to climb out of the cave and look at employment dis-
crimination law in the bright light of the sun. Although it was un-
derstandable that we looked at discrimination cases and saw the 
shadows (the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the mixed-
motives analysis) while we were prisoners in the cave, we cannot 
remain so shackled. On a sunny day in June 2003, the fetters of 
some prisoners were taken off, and we ascended out of the cave 
into the Desert and the light of the upper world.115 
Despite pleas to “see the light,” no circuit court of appeals has held 
that Desert Palace mandates that courts no longer apply McDonnell 
Douglas at the summary judgment stage. This, however, has not pre-
                                                                                                                     
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 992.  
 112. Corbett, supra note 4, at 1562. 
 113. Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2005) (alteration in 
original). 
 114. See Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and in with the New: The Second 
Circuit Shows It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Finally Overrule McDonnell Douglas, 11 
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 126 (2004) (“Because the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis 
will unfairly lead to the dismissal of certain legitimate cases at the summary judgment 
stage, the Supreme Court should explicitly reject it as it implicitly did in Desert Palace.”).  
 115. Corbett, supra note 4, at 1552-54 (claiming that after years of defending the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis, he has now seen “the bright light of the Desert (Palace) sun”). 
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vented some scholars from their continued stance that McDonnell 
Douglas is dead.116   
C.   Merging Desert Palace into the McDonnell Douglas Framework 
 Several courts and commentators suggest that Desert Palace 
should make it more difficult for defendant employers to win motions 
for summary judgment. As “the standard for when an issue can go to 
the jury is the same as the summary judgment standard, some courts 
have concluded that Desert Palace alters the summary judgment 
analysis for every Title VII claim.”117  
 In Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals concluded that Desert Palace requires a new analysis called 
“the modified McDonnell Douglas approach.”118 This approach merges 
the McDonnell Douglas single-motive and Price Waterhouse mixed-
motive analyses.119 In effect, however, all that changes is a modifica-
tion of the third-prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework.120  
 Under this modified McDonnell Douglas approach, the first two 
prongs of McDonnell Douglas remain the same.121 First, a plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case, and second, the defendant em-
ployer “must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for” 
the adverse employment action.122 At the third prong, however, a 
plaintiff has two options: (1) the plaintiff can show that the defen-
dant’s articulated reason was pretext (the “pretext” option); or (2) the 
plaintiff can show that, while the defendant’s articulated reason may 
be true, another motivating factor for the decision was discrimina-
tory (the “mixed-motive” option).123  
 In Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance, Co., the Fourth 
Circuit explained that “a Title VII plaintiff may ‘avert summary 
judgment . . . through two avenues of proof.’ ”124 In the first avenue, 
“[a] plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judgment by present-
ing direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of 
                                                                                                                     
 116. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavyweight: Costa as Counter-
monument to McDonnell Douglas—A Countermemory Reply to Instrumentalism, 67 ALB. L. 
REV. 965, 966 (2004) (predicting “that many courts would not at first grasp the revolution 
and would instead resort to instrumentalist rationalizations to ‘preserve the phenomenon’ 
of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine”).  
 117. Herawi v. Ala. Dep’t of Forensic Scis., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (M.D. Ala. 2004) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) and Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola 
Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 2003)).  
 118. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 313 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 119. Id. at 312. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics 
Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). 
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material fact as to whether an impermissible factor such as race mo-
tivated the employer’s adverse employment decision.”125 This first 
avenue, pursuant to the 1991 Act, does not require the plaintiff to 
show that the impermissible factor was the sole factor. Instead, it is 
enough to show that it was a motivating factor.126 The second avenue 
allows the plaintiff to “proceed under [the McDonnell Douglas] ‘pre-
text’ framework, under which the employee, after establishing a 
prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrates that the employer’s 
proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse employment ac-
tion is actually a pretext for discrimination.”127   
 Thus, under this modified approach, a plaintiff is no longer con-
fined to demonstrating pretext to survive summary judgment. 
“Rather, at step three, a plaintiff need only present sufficient evi-
dence, of any type, for a jury to conclude that the plaintiff’s disability 
was a ‘motivating factor’ for the employment action, even though the 
defendant’s legitimate reason may also be true or have played some 
role.”128 Ultimately, “[b]ecause there is no requirement that a case be 
classified at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff should be able 
to defeat a motion for summary judgment by producing sufficient 
evidence that the discriminatory reason was a motivating factor.”129 
VI.   DESERT PALACE’S PROPER IMPACT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 As is often the case between two extremes—abandoning McDon-
nell Douglas or strict adherence to McDonnell Douglas—the truth 
lies somewhere in the middle. Accordingly, because strict adherence 
to the single-motive McDonnell Douglas framework will lead to valid 
claims being improperly disposed of at summary judgment and be-
cause abandoning McDonnell Douglas will create disharmony among 
the lower courts in properly evaluating summary judgment claims, 
Desert Palace’s proper impact must be viewed as modifying the 
McDonnell Douglas framework.  
A.   A Rejection That McDonnell Douglas Is Unaffected 
 Strict adherence to the single-motive McDonnell Douglas frame-
work at the summary judgment stage is unworkable for two reasons: 
(1) trying to label cases as sole-factor or motivating-factor at the 
summary judgment stage is impractical, and, therefore, (2) requiring 
all cases to satisfy the pretext standard will lead to some cases—for 
                                                                                                                     
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. (quoting Hill, 354 F.3d at 285) (alteration in original). 
 128. Ordahl v. Forward Tech. Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1027 (D. Minn. 2004).  
 129. Corbett, supra note 4, at 1575-76. 
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example, Ann Hopkins’ case against Price Waterhouse—to be im-
properly dismissed at summary judgment.130  
 While it makes sense that Desert Palace should make it easier for 
a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment, it is still not 
clear who can proceed under a mixed-motive analysis at the sum-
mary judgment stage.131 In fact, determining what precisely consti-
tutes a mixed-motive versus a single-motive case early in the pro-
ceedings may prove problematic. While Desert Palace makes clear 
that either direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to establish 
a valid mixed-motive case,132 the question remains as to how much 
evidence is sufficient to warrant a mixed-motive analysis.  
 According to the Price Waterhouse Court, an intentional discrimina-
tion case need not be labeled “single-motive” or “mixed-motive” at the 
summary judgment stage.133 The plurality recognized that plaintiffs 
will often allege both pretext and, in the alternative, motivating fac-
tor.134 Ultimately, the court decides whether a case is properly labeled 
single-motive or mixed-motive.135 However, a court will postpone its 
determination until later in the proceedings to determine which cases 
will be allowed to proceed under the mixed-motive analysis.136  
 One option is for Congress or the Supreme Court to articulate a 
uniform standard for lower courts to apply in determining whether a 
plaintiff at the summary judgment stage has presented enough evi-
dence to merit mixed-motive treatment.137 The better option, however, 
is to continue to follow a modified McDonnell Douglas framework.  
B.   A Rejection That McDonnell Douglas Is Dead 
 Abandoning McDonnell Douglas altogether, and treating all Title 
VII cases the same, is the wrong solution because removing the 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989).  
 131. Darlene A. Vorachek, Litigation Strategy: Summary Judgment, Including Views 
from the Bench, in LITIGATION 2004, at 851, 864 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course 
Handbook Series No. 3352, 2004). 
 132. Chambers, supra note 61, at 83 (“Before Desert Palace, the motivating-factor in-
struction was considered by many to be available only when a plaintiff had presented di-
rect evidence to support the claim that an illegitimate factor was a motivating factor in a 
job decision.”).  
 133. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. For more information regarding suggested methods for determining the suffi-
ciency of evidence that would justify a case being labeled mixed-motive, see Chambers, su-
pra note 61, at 101-02 (suggesting three possible methods to determine the sufficiency of 
evidence). See also R. Joseph Barton, Determining the Meaning of “Direct Evidence” in Dis-
crimination Cases within the 11th Circuit: Why Judge Tjoflat Was (W)right, FLA. B.J., Oct. 
2003, at 42, 42 (advocating a three-prong “preponderance” standard set forth by Judge 
Tjoflat in the 11th Circuit).  
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framework will lead to increased judicial discretion and a return to the 
“notable lack of harmony” that existed prior to McDonnell Douglas.138  
 First, some advocates of this approach incorrectly argue that, 
post-Desert Palace, all disparate treatment cases should be treated 
the same—as mixed-motive.139 However, Congress has clearly recog-
nized two types of claims: (1) single-motive, where a winning plaintiff 
is entitled to the full array of damages, and (2) mixed-motive, where 
a winning plaintiff is entitled to only limited damages.140 While de-
fendants in either a single-motive or mixed-motive cases will argua-
bly present what amounts to a same-decision defense, this is not rea-
son alone to warrant treating all disparate treatment cases the 
same.141 Congress would not have articulated two separate remedial 
schemes if it intended the same test to apply. Congress clearly in-
tended that a defendant who proves that an employment decision 
was based entirely on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason will 
avoid damages altogether. However, where a defendant satisfies the 
same-decision test, such defendant will remain liable for limited 
damages where a plaintiff demonstrates that his or her protected 
category was a motivating factor in the decision.  
 Second, abandoning the McDonnell Douglas framework will 
“likely be a reversion to an older litigation model in which trial 
judges are not given specific rules to use to resolve specific types of 
disparate treatment cases, but instead have substantial discretion to 
dispose of all types of disparate treatment cases as they see fit.”142 
This is especially true in the context of summary judgment, where 
absolute judicial discretion is more likely to lead to judges dismissing 
any relatively weak case.143 At a minimum, the modified McDonnell 
Douglas framework requires judges to apply both the single-motive 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).  
 139. Davis, supra note 2, at 863 (arguing to “abandon the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work and declare that the Price Waterhouse approach governs all individual disparate 
treatment cases”).  
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000) (stating that when an employer demonstrates 
it “would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating fac-
tor, the court . . . may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and attorney’s fees,” but 
not “award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, 
promotion, or payment”); see also Chambers, supra note 61, at 93 (“[I]f the employer can 
prove that its decision would have been the same regardless of the use of the illegitimate 
factor, the plaintiff’s monetary recovery is limited.”).  
 141. See Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2003).  
 142. Chambers, supra note 61, at 84.  
 143. Henry L. Chambers Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in Dispa-
rate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103, 133 (2005) (“Allowing any more judicial discre-
tion than is absolutely necessary is particularly troubling because the exercise of discretion 
in the context of deciding summary adjudication replaces the judgment of a reasonable 
factfinder.”); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 561 (2001) (“It seems clear that courts are hostile to employment dis-
crimination cases, and I think the reason has to do not just with the perception that the 
cases are too easy to bring but also that most are lacking merit.”). 
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analysis and the mixed-motive analysis. Thus, while judges need not 
distinguish between single-motive and mixed-motive cases at the 
summary judgment stage,144 a modified approach, unlike abandoning 
McDonnell Douglas altogether, will at least provide a roadmap to 
judges who otherwise may be too quick to dispose of disparate treat-
ment cases at the summary judgment stage.145    
C.   The Truth Lies in the Middle: Accepting a Modified McDonnell 
Douglas Framework 
 Ultimately, Desert Palace’s proper impact on the summary judg-
ment stage of a Title VII claim simply requires a modification of the 
third prong of McDonnell Douglas. The modified McDonnell Douglas 
framework will ensure relative uniformity and harmony among the 
lower courts and will ensure that mixed-motive cases will survive 
summary judgment.  
 Justice Scalia made clear in Hicks that “[t]he McDonnell Doug-
las methodology was ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized or 
ritualistic.’ ”146 Further, several Justices have also recognized that 
“[c]ontinued adherence to the evidentiary scheme established in 
McDonnell Douglas . . . is a wiser course than creation of more dis-
array in an area of the law already difficult for the bench and 
bar,”147 not to mention this student.148 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 “[I]t is difficult to overestimate the import of summary adjudica-
tion,”149 especially in the employment context where summary judg-
ment is the standard tool used by employers to dispose of disparate 
treatment claims.150 Further, for courts, summary judgment is “a 
popular means for clearing dockets, and disposing of many of these 
cases.”151 Accordingly, it is immensely important that courts reach 
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 146. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (quoting Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).  
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 149. Chambers, supra note 143, at 107. 
 150. Donald J. Spero, Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa—Does McDonnell Douglas Survive?, 
FLA. B.J., Nov. 2004, at 53, 53 (“[M]otions for summary judgment are routinely filed by de-
fendants in discrimination cases.”).  
 151. Eric S. Riester, Comment, Making Sense of Pretext: An Analysis of Evidentiary 
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Sanderson Plumbing Products, and a Proposal for Clarification, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 261, 
265 (2002).  
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the proper consensus on how to analyze Title VII claims at the sum-
mary judgment stage. A modified McDonnell Douglas framework 
builds such consensus. Abandoning McDonnell Douglas altogether 
only makes things worse. 
